Construction leaders and professionals need to rebuild the public’s trust and confidence, says Dame Judith Hackitt. She speaks to Will Mann. Photography: Julie Kim.

Lord Pickles yesterday (7 April) apologised to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry “if he seemed discourteous” after reminding lead counsel to the Inquiry Richard Millett that he had an “extremely busy day”.

A review of Approved Document B (ADB) after the 2009 Lakanal House fire in which six people died “wasn’t immediately urgent” Lord Pickles, formerly Eric Pickles MP, has told the Grenfell Tower Inquiry.

A building regulations expert responsible for government guidance on fire safety has admitted that the failure of rainscreen cladding systems in large-scale fire tests in 2001, 16 years prior to the Grenfell Tower disaster, “just got missed”.

Former BRE director Debbie Smith appeared before the Grenfell Tower Inquiry yesterday (23 February) to face questions over the testing regime that governed construction products prior to the Grenfell Tower fire.

The Building Research Establishment (BRE) missed an opportunity help clarify government guidance that combustible ACM cladding should not be used on high-rise buildings in 2014.

Survivors of the Grenfell Tower disaster have called on the Metropolitan Police not to wait until a public inquiry has concluded before passing evidence from its investigations to prosecutors.

A large-scale cladding fire could not have happened had Building Regulations, British Standards and statutory guidance been followed and enforced “with reasonable diligence”, a lawyer for the government has told the Grenfell Tower Inquiry.

The Grenfell Tower disaster was “the predictable yet unintended consequence of the combination of the laudable desire to reduce carbon emissions coupled with an unbridled passion for deregulation”.

The construction industry developed modern methods of construction more quickly than the London fire service’s ability to understand them in terms of fire spread.

The theatre production about the Grenfell Tower Inquiry puts the built environment sector and all its murkiest machinations in the spotlight.

A government adviser told fire and rescue services that there was “insufficient information” to warrant an alert to housing authorities over the risks of certain types of cladding following the 2009 Lakanal House fire in London.

A failure of the regulatory system over decades and the “cynical and cavalier” attitude of cladding and insulation manufacturers were the main causes of the Grenfell Tower tragedy, the barrister for main contractor Rydon has told the Grenfell Tower Inquiry.

Arconic, the manufacturer of the Reynobond PE cladding used during the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower, and insulation manufacturers Celotex and Kingspan have all sought to deny responsibility for the Grenfell Tower fire in closing submissions given to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry.

The barrister acting for victims of the Grenfell Tower disaster has accused contractors and professionals in charge of the building of “wilful non-compliance”.

The external walls of Grenfell Tower should have been checked during a fire risk assessment of the building after its refurbishment, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry has heard.

Key moments from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry are to be dramatised in a run of verbatim theatre performances later this year.

Exactly four years on from the Grenfell Tower disaster, on 14 June 2017, CM looks back on the key events that have happened since