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The cladding used for the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower in west London was changed to a cheaper version, according to reports over the weekend.
The fireproof cladding planned for Grenfell Tower was downgraded to save £293,000 as housing officials demanded “good costs” to satisfy a council boss, leaked emails revealed.
In documents, seen by both the BBC and The Times, minutes of meetings, price outlines and other correspondence suggest a focus on cost-cutting before the £8.6m refurbishment of the building. The records include little evidence of safety concerns.
The document was sent to contractors as part of an overall drive to reduce the cost of the refurbishment from £9.2m to £8.5m.
According to The Times, officials at Kensington and Chelsea Tenants management Organisation, who were in charge of the tower, also sent an email to project management consultant Artelia urging “good costs” for the council.
At least 80 people are thought to have died in the fire at the west London block and it’s feared the full death toll won’t be known for months.
Meanwhile, cladding on 181 blocks in 51 areas has now failed fire safety tests. This represents 100% of all panels tested as part of the national safety operation to identify buildings with cladding similar to Grenfell tower.
Salford has the highest number of failed cladding with 29 towers found so far with the at-risk aluminium composite material.
Elsewhere last Friday the the chief executive of the Construction Industry Council (CIC), together with chief executives of Build UK and the Construction Products Association, met with the permanent secretary of the Department for Communities and Local Government, plus officials from the Cabinet Office, Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy, Homes and Communities Agency and the Local Government Association, to agree the establishment of a joint industry task force.
The task force will enable the sector to respond rapidly to the demand for construction products and services that will be needed to replace or install cladding and other fire safety equipment in the aftermath of Grenfell.
The industry is already drawing up plans for the remit, structure and membership of the task force.
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When you state fire proof do you mean fire resistant as the two are not the same. Was an entirely different type of panel previously proposed? I would like to know if the fire resistant version of the panels used has been tested and do they pass the testing? If not then this could all be irrelevant. Obviously the fire resistance of the insulation behind the cladding still needs to be taken into account at the same time as it is not yet known which caused more of an issue.
Why am I not surprised – I hope the contractors and the boss of the council aren’t sleeping and feel very guilty. Some people make you sick all to line their own pockets. Deepest sympathy to all the families this affected so sorry for your loses.
All these while the Building Regs always require either Class 0 or at least Class 1 materials to be used. So they must have failed to comply in the first place. The metal claddings are not combustible at all but the under-specified insulation could be allegedly the source. If the insulation was installed within the cavity of a double skinned blockwork, the risk would be minimal, instead of within the cavity between the external blockwork and metal cladding. I think the insulated rendering system is a high risk system as well because the thin render surface can hardly provide any fire resistance.
I would suggest the media hysteria on the LA drive to cheaper costs and subsequently costing lives to be unhelpful and does not fairly reflect the dialogue that takes place on procuring works like this.
LAs are hamstrung on funding and have to make tough decisions on where their expenditure is utilised. The long continuing Central Government mandate on economic austerity and reduced Government subsidy has done nothing to help LAs like Kensington & Chelsea in being able to implement the ‘nice to have’, so then forced down more inferior routes. The question remains and will be revealed on whether it complied with due regards to AD B? That is ultimately the only measure. I also understand that the tests currently being carried out by the BRE are only to the core material, not the composite product. This is in my opinion and a flawed and unrealistic test. The system and material should be tested as it would have been designed under the BBA or BS ISO code of practice of which it was passed and approved, not elements therein. What about this in the context of the numerous EWI schemes in place, where this contain plastics based insulation media behind the render, do these now present a fire risk by the same rationale??
From experience in ‘cost cutting’ exercises pre-contract it would be unusual to compromise safety for cost, but without seeing what information was passed between the parties we should not be too quick to judge one party or another, leave it to the experts. Hopefully lessons can be learned from this tragedy.
At the end of the day the Government are guilty of negligence, the manufacturer, the client or client’s representative, the contractor, project manager, all the way down the chain. CDM Regulations are quite clear. Everyone should know the rules, no one should be involved that are not fully qualified, trained to professional standards and able to act in an advisory capacity. This tragedy cannot be swept under the carpet, or should not be.
Agree with Paul O’Brien. Product should be tested as a product, and then design of the cladding as a system should consider limitations identified in any certification (e.g. Encapsulation); lead designer and building control should have been on this. A drive to save costs doesn’t mean the LA are asking for an inferior product. Would like to understand how this product and many similar products and systems are tested and how these relate to real world applications. Devil is in the detail. These type of significant quality issues are an indictment on how the industry procures and controls work and lack of investment in Building Control services… lowest cost dominates with little real interest in value offering.