Calls for changes to fire-related building regulations as well as revelations that cladding was replaced with a cheaper version on Grenfell Tower has flooded our site with comments. Here are a selection.
In response to our story Ex-BRE head urges Building Regs reform
Martin Fulford
This seems to be a smoke screen trying to divert attention. Should Building Control be made to physically test products being used?
The cladding used had a Class O fire rating, which means the product must have been tested at some point. If the cladding now does not meet the test for Class O either the product has changed since the test, or it was a “bad test”. Either way this is where the issue lies in my mind.
I do not know the testing process, but this too would need looking into, as I don’t understand how something with this rating burned so well. Possibly the testing process is not vigorous enough?
There are many questions to be answered, but I think his comments are avoiding the real issues.
Russ Fairhurst
David Strong’s comments that Building Control bodies are competing with each other to achieve sign off is ludicrous – they are responsible for compliance not testing.
The blame for this terrible incident must lie with the decision makers, the local authorities for allowing flammable materials to be fitted to high-rise buildings, politicians for voting against sprinkler systems and ill-equipped fire and rescue, designers for specifying this material when it is clearly banned in commercial sectors.
What testing has the BRE done on these materials in such situations?
Mike Underwood
This catastrophe is partly the result of the poor training the construction industry has been subjected to over many years where the emphasis has been on process at the expense of product knowledge. The degree of outsourcing right through the delivery chain has also exacerbated this problem.
John Ralph
This building was designed in the seventies when standards would have included the provision of a dedicated alternative means of escape for the occupants. If it didn’t have a secondary stair exit then the design responsibility becomes a matter of conscience for the architect, planning officer, chief building inspector and chief fire officer at the time.
The quite unbelievable signage by whoever, to quote, “STAY PUT” and put a blanket under the door in case of fire is absolute negligence. Hands up those who authorised this pathetic instruction. Eighty men women and children have died a horrible death due to total incompetence of individuals both past and present.
In response to the article – Grenfell cladding was replaced with cheaper version
Benjamin Sewell
Why am I not surprised – I hope the contractors and the boss of the council aren’t sleeping and feel very guilty. Some people make you sick all to line their own pockets. Deepest sympathy to all the families this affected so sorry for your loses.
Rich W
From experience in ‘cost cutting’ exercises pre-contract it would be unusual to compromise safety for cost, but without seeing what information was passed between the parties we should not be too quick to judge one party or another, leave it to the experts. Hopefully lessons can be learned from this tragedy.
Sheila
At the end of the day the government is guilty of negligence, the manufacturer, the client or client’s representative, the contractor, project manager, all the way down the chain. CDM Regulations are quite clear. Everyone should know the rules, no one should be involved that are not fully qualified, trained to professional standards and able to act in an advisory capacity. This tragedy cannot be swept under the carpet, or should not be.
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Frankly there is no single party to blame for this catastrophic event. The building regulations are clear in intent legislatively. It is down to implementation in practice given the circumstances. Designers do not ‘approve’ products – who does? And furthermore, how is this controlled through specification, purchasing, installation and building control processes? It is easy in hindsight to find a scapegoat to blame as a panacea but in reality, this will not overcome industry-wide problems. Cost is often cited as a cause but it is not as simple as this. Costs are ultimately driven by clients/end users and all related professionals, trades and suppliers but this is by no means any excuse for poor practices, lack of due diligence or discipline.
There are many issues continually facing the industry: the planning system, legislation changes, skills shortages and famine & feast financing and consequential programming. It is the more fundamental issues that require focus to avoid reoccurrences (as far as reasonably possible) of the like of the Grenfell Tower. Control measures are in place but it is their effectiveness wherein the difficulty lies. All too often shortcuts are taken at the last minute to achieve financial or occupation requirements. Issues are often complex because various stakeholders have differing requirements and ensuring all of these is satisfied appropriately is often under-resourced in time, money, quality, design and skills/understanding.
Where this adversely affects human life that we all must get back to basics! Guidance and regulations are good dicta for principal designer and contractors to co-ordinate and manage the life cycle processes of projects but ultimately it is the quality of the people involved, their effectiveness, time available and risk apportionment on the project. The truth is that in this society of convenience and peoples’ expectations are high but resources are stretched to attain value. Moreover; third-party involvement is resisted, planning is generally poor or on a needs-must basis profit maximisation is valued over consumer satisfaction. “It is what it is!”.
Tower blocks are not desirable but serve a purpose in modern day life and like all dwellings fulfil a purpose if designed and built sympathetically and properly. However, the majority of key risks to prevent loss of life are well documented and so there is no excuse for insufficient planning, poor fire egress design & co-ordination of materials or control of sign-off pre-occupation. It is inconceivable that independent reports into concerns raised by occupants were slow to come to fruition and fudged the genuine concerns raised.
It is quite clear that an ombudsman or commission for dwellings would be beneficial with similar regulatory powers of the HSE to review and improve living conditions. We all live in houses and have for centuries so why is this not in place to look after the welfare of our people? It is long overdue.
There is a long list of items that have culminated in this disaster in waiting actually happening.
The first and crucial step seems to be the government’s decision to not require fire certificates prior to occupation of buildings. This one thing was at the top of a slippery slope of deregulation and cost cutting – many current projects continue down this slippery slope.
Just this morning I had a manufacturer of a well-known cladding panel refuse to confirm if their panels were combustible or not. I advised that manufacturer that because they were so unhelpful I would not ever specify their products in the future.
All manufacturers should come clean. Do your products burn?
…. and not answer along the lines of “we paid for a test and it’s okay to use in a certain situation that might never be replicated in the real world….you will have to decide for yourself if that test is relevant to the installation you are proposing”
The answer is yes it does contribute to fuelling a fire and will burn or it will not burn.
The issue and validity of Third Party Testing and Assessment of products is now called seriously into question with the Grenfell Tower fire. While it appears from the manufacturers information sheet the panels were tested it also appears that they were assessed above 18m. We are very concerned that similar assessments are carried out as desktop assessments on fire doors. While desktop assessments of products are carried out in good faith, we have grave concerns and doubts that many assessed fire door solutions currently on the market would not perform to specification if fully tested. We would recommend that when specifying fire doors that the specification should insist on fire door sets that have been fully tested (not assessed) especially where doors contain fire glass vision panels.
Steve Moore
Disregarding the year Grenfell was constructed in the ’70s, many organisations responsible for the constructability of this structure should be put to serious professional questioning. I am sure there will be some testing agency in UK such we have in the United States “ASTM” which updates construction materials testing periodically for compliances. Moreover, a massive structure such as Grenfell could have been on regeneration lists after many years of existence due to expiration on building materials used for construction so as to minimize operation and maintenance. In addition, many companies engaged in producing potentially hazardous materials prefer to utilize an outside testing firm to minimize the danger of in-house exposure to hazardous agents. All construction industry administrators should be called for expert judgment prior to the arms of the law for adequate justice for the victims.
Sheila,
You are spot on, everyone all the way down should be made accountable as you rightly say the CDM regs are very clear and the whole thing stinks of a whitewash.
Three weeks on from the great fire of Kensington now … and so little done.
Response of the construction industry? … how about some actual construction? How about a prefab temporary village, as is done around the world for refugees, disaster relief.
I propose a community housed to good standards on Hyde Park/ Kensington Gardens, Holland Park- so much ‘green’ space. What are human priorities- somewhere to walk the dog/ go jogging or somewhere to live!!
This is a disaster- three weeks!! What a shambles.
What happened in the Blitz or after WW2 or after Ronan Point …
Is there really no plan, no vision, no hope, no skill, no will?