Exactly four years on from the Grenfell Tower disaster, on 14 June 2017, CM looks back on the key events that have happened since

The fire risk assessor at Grenfell Tower added post-nominals to his name for professional registrations he did not have or did not exist.

It was not “sensible” for combustible aluminium composite material (ACM) cladding to be used on a tall building like Grenfell Tower, even if it might have been interpreted that it was “allowed” under Building Regulations at the time, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry has heard.

A selection of readers’ comments about news and issues in the industry from www.constructionmanagement.co.uk

Paul Morrell explains to CM why, amid the uncomfortable revelations coming out of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, the construction industry needs to rally to fix problems wherever they are discovered.

Construction dust and debris generated during the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower may have contaminated an “essential” fire control switch.

Lawyers for the victims of the Grenfell Tower disaster have accused the council of ignoring residents’ fire safety concerns.

The British Board of Agrément (BBA) reported its suspicions that it may have been misled by Arconic to the Met Police, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry has heard.

A 2008 certificate issued by the British Board of Agrément (BBA) for Kingspan K15 insulation was based on data “extrapolated” from fire test reports on similar Kingspan phenolic products, some of which were 15 years old, in a “basic failure of due diligence” the Grenfell Tower Inquiry has heard.

An updated British Board of Agrément (BBA) certificate issued for Reynobond 55 cladding was “materially wrong”, after the BBA struggled to obtain information from manufacturer Arconic about the product.

A marketing manager at Arconic, the company that manufactured the combustible Reynobond PE 55 cladding used on Grenfell Tower, received a “very high shock” after attending a 2007 presentation warning of the combustibility of polyethylene-cored (PE) ACM cladding, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry has heard.

Vertical cavity barriers installed behind the cladding of Grenfell Tower during its refurbishment were so poorly installed that they were “totally ineffective” and non-compliant, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry has heard.…

A former Herefordshire Council building control survey claims he was “misled” by Kingspan and BBA documents when he issued an approval certificate for Kingspan K15.

A BRE director does not recall the organisation following up on a “wholly inaccurate” certificate issued by Herefordshire LABC that gave automatic acceptance for cladding systems employing Kingspan’s combustible K15 insulation on buildings over 18m in height.

The former BRE manager who oversaw the 2014 fire tests of Celotex’s RS 5000 insulation within a cladding system has denied he knew the rig was “manipulated” to achieve a pass after it failed its first test.

Arconic withdrew its combustible Reynobond 55 PE cladding from the market for high-rise buildings after the Grenfell Tower disaster because it felt it “couldn’t control the whole of the supply chain”, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry has heard.

Kingspan has used its financial results for 2020 to unveil a series of actions it is taking in response to “serious issues” that have arisen from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry process.

Arconic took no action following a 2009 cladding fire in a Bucharest building because there was no injury, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry has heard.