The second phase of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry has begun, after phase one examined what happened on the night on 14 June 2017, when 72 people died in a devastating blaze.
But what is phase two examining and who is involved?
Giving his opening statement yesterday (27 January), counsel to the inquiry Richard Millett QC explained that if phase one looked at the immediate causes and effects of the fire, phase two is an examination of the reasons why it happened.
The latest phase has been split into eight modules across the year:
Module 1:
Will examine the role of professionals involved in the refurbishment of the tower from 2012 to its sign-off in 2016.
Witnesses will include:
- Studio E (architect)
- Rydon (design and build contractor)
- Harley (cladding subcontractor)
- Exova (fire safety engineer)
- CEP (fabricator of the aluminium composite panels)
- Artelia (employer’s agent, quantity surveyor and CDM co-ordinator)
- Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea’s building control department
- Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation
Module 1 is due to run until the end of April this year.
Module 2:
Will examine the testing, certification, and marketing of key products used in the external wall, specially the ACM panels used in the rainscreen system.
Witnesses will include:
- Arconic (which made and sold the ACM panels used in the rainscreen system)
- Celotex (which made and sold the polyisocyanurate [PIR] and phenolic insulation behind the ACM panels – principally its RS5000 product)
- Kingspan (which made and sold the K15 Kooltherm product)
- Siderise (which made and sold the cavity barriers)
- Aluglaze (which made the window infill panels)
Module 2 is due to start on 4 May and evidence will be heard until mid-June.
Module 3:
Will investigate the complaints made by residents of the tower before 14 June 2017, particularly relating to fire safety and concerns about fire doors and the quality of workmanship during the refurbishment. It will also look at the responses from the Tenant Management Organisation (TMO) and the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) to those complaints.
It will also consider compliance by the TMO, RBKC and the London Fire Brigade with the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 and the active and passive fire safety systems inside the tower including lifts, fire doors, smoke extraction systems and the gas supply system.
Module 3 will run from the end of June this year until early October when there will be closing statements on all three modules.
Module 4:
Will examine the performance of local and central government in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. It is expected to run from mid-October until mid-November this year.
Module 5:
Will consider the adequacy of the firefighting response on the night of the fire. It is timetabled to run from November this year until mid-February next year with a two-week break for Christmas.
Module 6:
Will involve a study of central and local government’s role in the disaster. Following on from the evidence in module 2, it will also examine the existing regime for testing, certification and classification of materials for use in external cladding systems. Module 6 is due to run from the third week of February next year until early May next year including a two-week break for Easter.
Module 7:
Will be devoted to the remaining expert evidence and will run for a week until mid-May next year.
Module 8:
Dedicated to any remaining evidence and all submissions relating to the circumstances in which people met their death not covered in earlier modules. The bereaved, survivors and residents have been invited to provide written submissions as to further matters to be covered in the module. The timetable depends on these submissions.
Comments
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No surprises about no one accepting resposibility for their part in the Grenfell disaster. How and where did the fire start in the first place though? There is no mention of that?
No reference is made to electrical safety systems, or the choice of wiring recommended for critical life-saving applications. This requires an urgent assessment.
At some stage, an individual or a group of persons in the design and construction team made the decision to go forward with the composite construction that represented the over-cladding system that would .be used on this building. This is the combination of materials that reasonably clearly as individual components, and, as a composite construction, are now known to have been unsuitable for purpose. Indeed, as has recently been shown, from the details provided by persons representing the individual manufacturers and suppliers of the materials; representations made before the construction commenced, these materials were unfit for purpose. The individual or members of the team that approved the construction must be identified. Surely the decision to move ahead with the cladding construction is key to the cause of this tragedy, especially if the expert knowledge of the individual materials manufacturers and suppliers was set aside or overridden. So, those persons are surely to blame and must be held accountable. The UK Building Regulations, particularly in fact, the regulations as relate to fire, are a complex mess and are clearly partly to blame, as are the authorities and agencies responsible in this case for interpreting the regulations and allowing this construction to be adopted. The contractors, aside from perhaps willingly having engaged in “value-engineering” at an early stage – before construction started, are possibly least to blame unless it can be proven that vital elements of the approved construction, unfit for purpose as it seems it was, such as cavity fire-stopping, was installed incorrectly, or missing in certain locations.
I totally agree with Mr Williams. No reference is made to electrical safety systems. This does require an urgent assessment!
We innovated an electrical fire safety system which would have prevented the Grenfell disaster! The government have known about this for many years but has done nothing about it!
All of the Chief Fire Officers in the UK know about this and have endorsed it. It has passed all of the safety regulations. But because of vested interests it never reached the people.
Christine Heathcote, 18th February, 2020
In view of Mr William’s comments of the 28th January 2020, I have to agree with this gentleman. There are no reference made to electrical safety systems etc.
We have a electrical fire safety system which all chief fire officers in the UK and around the world know about long before that terrible disaster happened which could have prevented the Grenfell fire starting in the first place.
They all know about this system but failed to inform others at risks about this because of vested interests in the UK.
I would also add that we spent a fortune developing these devices, with no help from the government whatsoever!
The fire service in the UK endorsed it. It has passed all the safety regulations in the UK and abroad but still the UK government does nothing! People are still at risks of such fires!
We had to flee the UK even though we are UK citizens because our lives were in danger because of what we’d innovated. Yes and the government know all this too!
Even before phase one of the Grenfell inquiry started I contacted many MPs and government officials, the prime minister etc. This was simply to let them know that we had the solution for electrical fires of this type! Long before that terrible disaster happened and since then but to no avail! Even when you show them evidence and can call on many professional witnesses!
If you are not wealthy don’t waste your time innovating anything in the UK because the government are not interested. We spent all that we had over the years on these fire safety devise and had to escape from the UK to live abroad because of criminal threats, criminal operations with the motive to steal our technology.
I would say to the UK government this requires an urgent investigation.
Christine Heathcote, 18th February 2020